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PERSONAL PROPERTY
THE LAw OF FiXTURES (SCHOOL BUILDINGS) MODIFIED BY
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

D ICKENSON

v. Board of Trustees of the Chico lndependen
School District1 involved the question of whether school build.
ings, constructed at public expense, upon land granted upon determinable fee to the School District reverted with the land upon
defeasance of the estate. The Court of Civil Appeals, principally
on the authority of an earlier Court of Civil Appeals case, held
that the buildings did not revert and that the trustees of the school
district had a right to remove the improvements.
Plaintiff was the owner of a possibility of reverter under a deed
to the school district which provided that the land should revert
to the grantor should it cease to be used for school purposes. In
1946 the trustees of the school district decided to abandon the
land and sell or salvage the school buildings. Upon notification
of the trustees' intentions the plaintiff brought an action in trespass to try title. The trial court gave judgment to the plaintiff
for the land but awarded the improvements to the school district.
The plaintiff appealed on the grounds that under the well established doctrines of the law of fixtures the buildings had become a
part of the realty and reverted with the land'. The Court of Civil
Appeals rejected this view and relied upon general considerations of public policy deemed to be implicit in four articles of
the Texas Statutes' to affirm the judgment.
The preponderance of authority in other jurisdictions seems
to be opposed to the Texas decisions', and only one other state
1 204 S. W. (2d) 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) wrt of errorrefused.
v. Franks, 166 S. W. 384 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) writ of errorrefused.
s E. g. Hutchins v. Masterson, 46 Tex. 551 (1877) ; Jones v. Bull, 85 Tex. 136, 19
S. W. 1031 (1892); Brown v. Roland, 92 Tex. 54, 45 S. W. 795 (189).
'TEx. Rav. CIv. STAT. ANN. (Vernon 1925) Articles 2748, 2752, 2754, 276.
5 E. g, Allemania Fire Ins. Co. v. Winding Gulf Collieries, 60 F. Supp. 65 (S. D. V
2Allen
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court has adopted a similar view though a strained statutory construction'. While the Texas view can be defended as producing
the most desirable result, it may be said that its basis at common
law is unsound and the statutory construction supporting it seems
to be little less than judicial legislation.
NEW FACTOR'S LIEN STATUTE

Article 5506c7 , enacted by the 50th Legislature in 1947, provides for the creation of a lien by written contract upon merchandise' in the possession or custody of the lienor in favor of one
who advances money upon security of such merchandise. Merchandise which subsequently comes into the possession of the
lienor may also become subject to the lien if subsequently identified in a separate written instrument signed by the lienor and
delivered to the factor.' The lien becomes effective when filed
with the clerk of the county where any part of the merchandise
subject to the lien is located and when a notice, containing the
information required by the act, is posted at a conspicuous place
at one of the principal entrances of the place where the merchandise is located." The lien affords superiority over the claims of
Va. 1945) ; Williams v. Kirby School Dist., 207 Ark. 458, 181 S. W. (2d) 488 (Ark. S. Ct.
1944) ; Rustin v. Butler, 195 Ga. 389, 24 S. E. (2d) 318 (Ga. S. Ct. 1943) ; Board of
Education for Jefferson City v. Littrell, 173 Ky. 78, 190 S. W. (Ky. Ct. App. 1917);
Webster Cty. Board of Education v. Gentry, 233 Ky. 35,24 S. W. (2d) 910 (Ky. CL App.
1930); Webster Cty. Board of Education v. Wynn, 303 Ky. 1010, 196 S. W. (2d) 983
(Ky. CL App. 1946) ; School Dist. No. 42 of Cascade Cty. v. Pribyl, 82 Mont. 296, 267
Pac. 289 (Mont. S. Ct. 1928) ; Collette v. Town of Charlotte, 114 VL 357, 45 A. (2d) 203
(Vt. S. Ct. 1946).
0 Schwing v. McClure, 120 Oh. St. 335, 166 N. E. 230 (Ohio S. Ct. 1929) (See the
strong dissenting opinion by Marshall, C. J.)
TTa. Rav. Cm. STAT. ANN. (Vernon's Supp., 1947) Art. 5506c.
s Section 1 defines "merchandise" as "materials, goods in process, and finished goods
intended for sale, whether or not requiring further manufacturing or processing." The
applicability of the Act is limited by Section 10 to merchandise which is not daily exposed
to sale at retail in parcels in the regular course of business.
' Section 1 defines "factor" as any person, firm, banlk or corporation, and their successors in interest, who advance money on the security of merchandise, whether or not
they10are employed to sell the merchandise.
Compliance with the provisions of filing and notice is not necessary when the factor
is in possession of the merchandise subject to the lien.
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unsecured creditors and subsequent liens, except as against specific liens arising from contractual acts of the lienor in the marketing of the merchandise. A purchaser of the merchandise subject
to the lien takes free of the lien but the lien attaches to the proceeds of the lien in the hands of the lienor. Upon satisfaction of
the indebtedness secured by the lien, the factor may be required,
upon the demand of any interested party, to sign a certificate
of discharge which may be filed with the record of the lien. Until
such certificate shall have been filed the lien is deemed to be in
full force. The statute provides that a substantial compliance with
its requirements shall be sufficient to support a valid lien.
W.P.B.

